Eliminating Terrorism: What Can Be Learned from China and Sri Lanka?

Balochistan is once again confronting a troubling resurgence of organized violence. Coordinated attacks across Quetta, Mastung, Panjgur, Kech, Kalat, and other districts have underscored the evolving operational capacity of militant networks. These were not random incidents but synchronized assaults designed to project strength, undermine state authority, and generate psychological impact nationwide. The scale and simultaneity of these attacks indicate structured command, logistical planning, and access to modern communication tools.

Groups such as the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), and Baloch National Army (BNA) have long operated in the province. Recent tactics—including suicide bombings and the targeting of infrastructure—reflect adaptation and coordination. The broader regional environment adds complexity. Porous borders, cross-border militant sanctuaries, and geopolitical rivalries create opportunities for non-state actors to exploit instability. Yet external dimensions alone do not explain the persistence of unrest.

Balochistan’s internal realities must be acknowledged. Despite accounting for nearly 44 percent of Pakistan’s landmass and possessing substantial mineral reserves—including copper and gold deposits at Reko Diq and Saindak—the province remains economically underdeveloped. Literacy rates have historically lagged behind the national average, and unemployment among youth remains a pressing concern. Infrastructure gaps in healthcare, education, and connectivity contribute to perceptions of marginalization. Militancy thrives where governance deficits intersect with narratives of deprivation.

In searching for policy lessons, analysts frequently point to China and Sri Lanka—two states that confronted prolonged militancy and ultimately reasserted control. While the political contexts differ significantly from Pakistan’s, their experiences provide instructive insights into strategy, coordination, and state resolve.

Sri Lanka’s battle with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) lasted from 1983 to 2009, making it one of the longest-running insurgencies in South Asia. The LTTE was not merely a guerrilla force; it functioned as a quasi-state entity, maintaining territorial control, taxation systems, and even a naval wing known as the “Sea Tigers.” By the mid-2000s, Sri Lanka recalibrated its counterinsurgency approach. The government centralized command structures, increased defense spending to nearly 5 percent of GDP during peak operations, and strengthened intelligence coordination. Crucially, it targeted the LTTE’s financial networks abroad, disrupting diaspora funding streams that had sustained the group for decades. Maritime blockades curtailed arms smuggling routes, while sustained ground offensives dismantled territorial strongholds. By May 2009, the LTTE’s military leadership had been eliminated, effectively ending the insurgency’s armed phase.

China’s approach in Xinjiang followed a different model. During the 1990s and early 2000s, sporadic violent incidents were attributed to separatist groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Following heightened unrest in 2009, Beijing intensified its strategy. The policy combined stringent security enforcement, expansive surveillance technologies—including facial recognition systems and digital monitoring—and large-scale economic integration. Xinjiang became a focal point of infrastructure investment under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with billions of dollars directed toward highways, rail links, energy pipelines, and industrial zones. Between 2014 and 2019, Chinese authorities reported thousands of counterterrorism arrests as part of what they termed a “strike hard” campaign. Simultaneously, vocational training programs were introduced, framed by Beijing as deradicalization initiatives aimed at integrating marginalized populations into the workforce.

Both cases underscore several strategic principles. First, unity of command matters. Fragmented political or military leadership prolongs insurgencies. Sri Lanka’s decisive phase succeeded in part because political leadership and military strategy operated under a coherent framework. Second, disrupting financial and logistical networks is as vital as confronting fighters on the battlefield. Militancy weakens when funding pipelines, recruitment channels, and propaganda mechanisms are systematically dismantled. Third, development initiatives—whether in Xinjiang’s industrial zones or Sri Lanka’s post-war reconstruction in the Northern Province—are used to consolidate stability after military gains.

However, these approaches have not been without controversy. International human rights organizations have criticized both governments—Sri Lanka over civilian casualties during the final stages of the war, and China over policies in Xinjiang. These debates illustrate an important tension: security operations that restore order must also maintain legitimacy, particularly in a globalized environment where international perception influences diplomacy and investment.

For Pakistan, the central lesson lies in integration rather than imitation. There can be no compromise on dismantling militant infrastructure in Balochistan. Intelligence-sharing between civil and military agencies must be seamless. Border management along the western frontier requires technological upgrading, surveillance enhancement, and coordinated patrol mechanisms. Financial tracking systems should target funding sources, including illicit trade and external sponsorship.

Yet security enforcement must proceed alongside inclusive governance. Mega-projects such as the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the development of Gwadar Port represent transformative opportunities. Gwadar’s potential as a deep-sea port linking Central Asia to the Arabian Sea could reshape regional trade flows. But economic corridors cannot succeed if local communities remain economically detached. Employment quotas, vocational institutes, scholarships, and healthcare investments must visibly uplift local populations. Development that is participatory builds ownership; development perceived as extractive breeds resentment.

Political dialogue is equally essential. Engaging tribal elders, civil society actors, and youth leaders within constitutional frameworks fosters legitimacy. Sustainable peace emerges not solely from battlefield victories but from social contracts that restore trust between the state and its citizens.

Balochistan occupies a strategic crossroads bordering Iran and Afghanistan and overlooking critical maritime routes. Instability reverberates beyond provincial boundaries, affecting regional connectivity and investor confidence. Conversely, stability would enhance Pakistan’s geopolitical leverage and economic prospects.

The experiences of China and Sri Lanka demonstrate that militancy can be defeated when state authority is consistent, intelligence is coordinated, and economic strategies reinforce security gains. For Pakistan, the path forward demands a calibrated blend of firmness and inclusion—decisive enforcement of the rule of law coupled with equitable development and political integration. If pursued with unity and strategic clarity, Balochistan can transition from recurring unrest to enduring stability, transforming from a security concern into a pillar of regional opportunity.